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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. § 78-22(3)0) a n d Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured over
to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Ms. Pasquin's alleged oral

partnership agreement was void under the statute of frauds and that consequently Ms.
Pasquin's claims against the Duffins should be dismissed with prejudice.
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material
fact issues. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp.. v. Campbell. 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App.
1992).
2.

Whether the Duffins owed any duty to Ms. Pasquin.

The reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground
available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County.
855 P.2d231 (Utah) 1993).

1

3.

Whether the trial court correctly denied Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion

with respect to the Duffins.
The appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion under
an abuse of discretion standard. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah
App. 1988).
RELEVANT STATUTES
U.C.A. § 25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written and
signed.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement,
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement which by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from the
making of the agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

John and Kory Pasquin formed Quality Parts, a Utah general

partnership, early in the 1990s.

John and Kory Pasquin formed Quality Transport

Refrigeration Parts, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Quality Transport") in early 1996 to take over
the business of Quality Parts. (R. 94)
2.

Thomas and Daniel Duffin ("the Duffins") are attorneys practicing law

in Salt Lake City, Utah. Beginning in 1990 the Duffins handled business matters on behalf
of Quality Parts and subsequently Quality Transport. The Duffins' clients were Kory and
John Pasquin. (R. 84, 86)
2

3.

Ms. Pasquin alleges in her complaint that after Kory and John Pasquin

formed Quality Parts, Kory Pasquin recruited her to become a partner. (R. 94, 95) The
partnership was pursuant to an oral partnership agreement, although Ms. Pasquin argues that
Quality Parts' invoices, paychecks and car insurance payments evidenced the agreement to
make Ms. Pasquin a partner.1 (R. 88, 94-95)
4.

Ms. Pasquin5s complaint also alleges that she entered into an oral

agreement with Kory Pasquin for lifetime employment. (R. 96)
5.

Ms. Pasquin claims that when Kory and John Pasquin formed Quality

Transport, they led her "to believe that her one-third partnership interest in Quality Parts
would transfer over to a one-third interest in [Quality Transport] and that Quality Transport
"would honor all agreements that Quality Parts had with [Ms. Pasquin]." (R. 96)
6.

Between 1991 and 1994 Thomas Duffin had no contact with Ms.

Pasquin in a business sense as a partner of Quality Parts or as a person having any interest
in Quality Transport. He had no specific dealings with Ms. Pasquin at all.2 (R. 84)
7.

During the time Quality Transport was incorporating, Daniel Duffin had

conversations with Kory and John Pasquin. Ms. Pasquin's name was never mentioned during
this time nor in any subsequent conversations with either Kory or John Pasquin. (R. 86)
*Ms. Pasquin opposed the Duffins' Motion for Summary Judgment by verifying
the allegations in her complaint (R. 88, 93-106) and submitting three additional
paragraphs of alleged material facts in a "Statement of Disputed Facts." (R.88)
2

The affidavits of Thomas and Daniel Duffin submitted in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 83-86) are attached in the Addendum to this brief.
3

8.

From 1993 to the date of Kory Pasquin's death, Daniel Duffin had no

contact with Ms. Pasquin in a business sense as a partner in Quality Parts or as a person
having any interest in the Quality Transport. He had no specific dealings with Ms. Pasquin
at all. (R. 86)
9.

Neither of the Duffins is aware of any writing representing Ms. Pasquin

had an ownership interest in either Quality Parts or Quality Transport. (R. 84, 86)
10.

The first and only contact Ms. Pasquin alleges with the Duffins occurred

after Kory Pasquin's death.3 A meeting took place in the Duffins' law offices wherein it was
alleged by a Boyd Simper in the presence of the Duffins that Ms. Pasquin was "part of the
company." Ms. Pasquin alleges no other direct contact with the Duffins on the subject of her
partnership, ownership interest in Quality Transport or lifetime employment agreement. (R.
97)
11.

Ms. Pasquin alleges in her complaint that the Duffins were her lawyers

because she was a partner in Quality Parts. She alleges that by assisting John and Kory
Pasquin in forming the Quality Transport corporation and transferring assets and business
of the partnership thereto without providing for her ownership interest, the Duffins breached
fiduciary duties owed to her. (R. 100-101)

3

Kory Pasquin passed away after formation of Quality Transport. Accordingly,
Ms. Pasquin alleges no communication whatsoever with the Duffins when the alleged
oral partnership between John, Kory and Ms. Pasquin existed.
4

12.

Ms. Pasquin states in her complaint "if [the Duffins] were not fully

aware of plaintiff s claim of a partnership interest in said assets and business prior to Kory's
death, the statements of Boyd Simper that plaintiff was a part of the partnership put them on
notice of their fiduciary duty to plaintiff. Yet the Duffins have advised John and the
company to resist the plaintiffs claims and have expressly induced the company and John
to breach their employment agreements with the plaintiff." (R. 101)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly held that the oral partnership agreement alleged by Ms.
Pasquin was void under the statute of frauds. A majority of courts considering similar facts
have held that an oral partnership agreement not to be performed within a year is terminable
at will. Accordingly, the oral partnership agreement alleged by Ms. Pasquin was terminated
when Kory and John Pasquin formed the Quality Transport corporation.
Ms. Pasquin's alleged partial performance of the oral partnership agreement
and her equitable estoppel claim do not defeat the Duffins5 statute of frauds defense. Partial
performance does not vitiate the statute of frauds and Ms. Pasquin failed to offer any material
facts to support an equitable estoppel claim against the Duffins.
The Duffins owed no legal duty to Ms. Pasquin because no attorney-client or
other fiduciary relationship existed between the Duffins and Ms. Pasquin. Finally, the trial
correctly denied Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion with respect to the Duffins because Ms.
Pasquin failed to supply the trial court with any verified material facts indicating what

5

additional facts she sought to discover that might assist in proving her claims against the
Duffins.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ALLEGED
ORAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WAS VOID UNDER THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A.

Any Oral Partnership Agreement that May have Existed with Ms.
Pasquin was Terminable at Will

The Estate of Kory Pasquin moved first for summary judgment in this case,
arguing that the oral partnership agreement and lifetime employment agreement alleged by
Ms. Pasquin were void under UCA 25-5-4(1) because they were not to be performed within
a year. (R. 76-78) The Duffins joined the Estate's motion and filed as additional support the
affidavits of Thomas and Daniel Duffin.

(R. 80-86) Ms. Pasquin filed an opposing

memorandum, which she supported by verifying her Complaint and submitting three
additional paragraphs of verified facts contained in a "Statement of Disputed Facts."4 (R. 87106)

4

On September 25 and October 10, 1998 Ms. Pasquin filed additional memoranda
opposing summary judgment and in support of her Rule 56(f) motion (R. 143-148, 155162) Ms. Pasquin's opposing memoranda contained verifications under which she
purports to have "read the foregoing instrument and that based upon my personal
knowledge the factual allegations contained therein are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and information." Ms. Pasquin's verification of legal memoranda containing
mixed factual allegations and legal arguments should be disregarded by this court. To the
extent verified, material facts may be gleaned from Ms. Pasquin's memoranda, they have
no bearing on the Duffins' Motion for Summary Judgment or issues relevant to the
Duffins' appellate arguments.
6

Ms. Pasquin argued in her opposing memorandum that the oral agreement to
make her a partner could be performed within a year. She claimed that since the agreement
to make her a partner was performed immediately and she thereafter performed as partner,
the statute of frauds is inapplicable. (R. 89) Ms. Pasquin also argued that writings supported
the oral partnership agreement and the employment agreement.5 (R.89-90)
The trial court granted the Estate of Pasquin and Duffins' Motions for
Summary Judgment for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda. (R. 153) The
court subsequently entered its Amended Summary Judgment with respect to the Duffin
defendants, stating there was no cause of action against the Duffins by plaintiff as there is
no evidence of a partnership between the plaintiff and the other defendants." (R. 215)
Most courts considering this issue have agreed with the trial court's ruling in
this case, holding that a parol agreement for a partnership intended to last more than a year
is void under the statute of frauds.
In Wahl v. Barnum. 22 N.E. 280 (N.Y. 1889) plaintiffs verbally agreed with
one of the defendants to form a co-partnership for three years to succeed defendants' former
firm. The defendant was to contribute the remaining merchandise of the old firm and the
plaintiffs were each to contribute $5,000.00 toward partnership capital. No time for payment

5

Although Ms. Pasquin claimed that several different writings supported her
partnership status, the only writing she submitted to the trial court consisted of a Quality
Parts invoice bearing in the bottom right hand comer the legend: "Please accept our
sincere thanks for letting us serve you Kory - John & Geri." (R. 107)
7

of the partnership capital was agreed upon. The Wahl court held that the contract of copartnership was within the clause of the statute of frauds requiring contracts not to be
performed within a year to be in writing and was hence "determinable at will". Id. at 282.
In Pinner v. Leder. 188 N.Y.S. 818 (1921) the court held an oral partnership
agreement to continue for more than three years falls within the statute of frauds. The court
held that the oral agreement was not void in and of itself, but only under the statute of frauds.
The court further observed that:
An oral agreement described in the statute of frauds in not void
in and of itself, but only void under the statute, and the plea of
its invalidity must be affirmatively interposed . . . The mere fact
that the contract is terminable at the will of one party renders it
nonetheless a contract recognized as valid and subsisting until
such determination. If a partnership is one dissolvable at will,
a partner's election to dissolve the partnership is not a breach of
the partnership contract and there is no right to recover damages
resulting from the dissolution, in the absence of a partnership
agreement to the contrary."
Id. at 819.
59A Am Jur. 2d Partnership § 88 (1974), echoes the above holdings, stating
"an oral partnership agreement without provision for its duration creates a partnership at will
and while it is dissoluble within one year for purposes of the statute of frauds, it need not
necessarily terminate in that time."
At least one court has held contra. In Shropshire v. Adams, 89 S.W. 448 (Tex.
1905) the court held that an oral partnership contract to be continued for five years was not
within the statute of frauds. The court reasoned that "inasmuch as the death of either party
8

would work a dissolution of the partnership . . . it follows, also, that the contract of
partnership was not within the statute of frauds." Id. at 449.
The Shropshire court's reasoning is suspect, in that it would

effectively

eviscerate the one year provision contained in UCA 25-5-4(1) and similar statutes. Applying
the Shropshire court's reasoning, parties could argue that any number of contingencies might
occur which would terminate the partnership within one year. Death of a partner, dissolution
by one of the partners or some other imagined event that rendered performance impossible
could conceivably occur within the one year period. Under the Shropshire court's analytical
approach, it would be difficult to ever demonstrate that a partnership agreement (or indeed
most contracts) could not be performed within a year.
Ms. Pasquin has never alleged that the alleged oral partnership agreement
between herself and John and Kory Pasquin was to be performed within a year. Indeed she
alleges that she was to be employed by the partnership for her life, implying that the
partnership was to last at least until her death. Accordingly, the alleged partnership was, at
most, a partnership at will.
If a partnership is one at will, without any definite term or definite undertaking
to be accomplished, a dissolution by the election of one partner is not a breach of contract.
The terminating partner incurs no liability, whatever the motive for the termination may have
been. This rule extends to bar tort and other claims premised upon an unenforceable
contract. Mildfelt v. Lair. 561 P.2d 805, 813 (Kan. 1977).

9

Even if the alleged oral partnership agreement existed, any partnership formed
thereby was dissolved at the formation of Quality Transport. Because the oral agreement
created — at most - a partnership at will, no action exists by Ms. Pasquin against the Duffins
for breach of contract, tort or any other claim premised upon the unenforceable contract.
B.

Ms, Pasquin's Alleged Partial Performance Does not Overcome the
Duffins' Statute of Frauds Defense

Ms. Pasquin also argues since she immediately commenced performance under
the terms of the alleged oral partnership agreement, the agreement is not encompassed by the
statute of frauds. However, it is clear that partial performance of a contract within a year
does not take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds. The term "performance" in the
one year statute of frauds provision means complete performance. Pemberton v. LaDue
Realty & Constr. Co., 244 S.W. 2d 62 (Mo. 1951); Sophie v. Ford. 245 N.Y.S. 470 (1930).
The statute of frauds renders a contract not fully to be performed within a year — insofar as
executory — completely unenforceable, and does not permit it to be enforced against the
defendant to the extent that its performance within a year is called for. Pemberton at 64.
C.

Ms, Pasquin's Equitable Estoppel Claim has no Bearing on the
Duffins' Statute of Frauds Defense

Ms. Pasquin relies on Jacobsen v. Cox. 202 P.2d 714 (Utah 1949) to argue that
the Duffins' statute of frauds defense is rendered inoperative by an estoppel in pais. An
estoppel in pais is the doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or

10

silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have
had. Mitchell v. Mclntee. 514 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Or. 1973).
To constitute an equitable estoppel, or estoppel by conduct, (1) there must be
a false representation; (2) it must be made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party
must have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the other party; and (5) the other party must have been induced to
act upon it. Mitchell at 1359.
As argued above, Ms. Pasquin has alleged no false representation by either of
the Duffms. In addition, the only record evidence before the court shows the Duffms had no
knowledge that Ms. Pasquin even claimed a partnership interest. Ms. Pasquin did not submit
any verified, material facts to support her naked allegation that the Duffms knew or should
have known of the alleged oral partnership agreement. In short, Ms. Pasquin has submitted
no material fact that would preclude the Duffms, by reason of equitable estoppel, from
asserting their statute of frauds defense.
II.

THE DUFFINS OWED NO LEGAL DUTY TO MS. PASQUIN
A.

No Attorney-Client Relationship Existed Between the Duffms and
Ms, Pasquin

The Duffms submitted affidavits in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment alleging they never considered Ms. Pasquin a client, were not aware that she was
ever a partner in Quality Parts and were not aware of any right on Ms. Pasquin's part to
lifetime employment. Based on these affidavits, the Duffms argued that Ms. Pasquin could
11

not prevail on her claim against them, including her claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
interference with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court did not reach the issue of whether the Duffins' owed Ms.
Pasquin any duty, ruling that the alleged oral partnership agreement was void under the
statute of frauds. However, the lack of an attorney-client or other fiduciary relationship
provides this court with an additional basis for upholding the trial court's summary judgment
with regard to the Duffins. A reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on
any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt
Lake County. 855 P.2d231 (Utah 1993).
Ms. Pasquin argues in her brief that her "sworn testimony states that she was
made a partner, that she did consider [the Duffins] to be her attorneys, that she was promised
lifetime employment, and such [sic]. Ms. Pasquin's sworn testimony disputed all materials
facts argued by the Duffin defendants in their motion." (Ms. Pasquin's opening brief, p. 30.)
A client's mere belief that an attorney-client relationship exists, unless
reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the attorney, is not sufficient to create
the relationship. Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). In
Breuer-Harrison, a real estate purchaser brought action against a vendor for rescission and
the vendor cross-claimed against a title insurer for negligence. The Court of Appeals held
that neither the title insurer nor searching attorney could be held liable to the vendor for
negligence in failing to discover an irremediable easement.

12

In holding that no attorney-client relationship - and hence no duty - existed,
the Utah Court of Appeals observed that "an attorney-client relationship cannot be created
unilaterally in the mind of a would-be client; a reasonable belief is required." Id. at 728,
citing Hecht v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3rd 560, 237 Cal. Rptr. 528, 531 (1987). The
rationale for this rule is readily apparent: it would be manifestly unfair to impose an attorneyclient relationship on an attorney when he or she has no reasonable basis to know such a
relationship exists.
Because no attorney-client relationship existed between Ms. Pasquin and the
Duffins, there is no liability on the part of the Duffins to Ms. Pasquin. No liability exists
under the law of torts unless a person from whom relief is sought owed a duty to the
allegedly injured party. Vickers v. Hanover Const. Co., Inc., 875 P.2d 929 (Id. 1994). In this
case there is no factual or legal basis for a duty owed by the Duffins to Ms. Pasquin.
It is well-settled that an attorney, while performing his obligations to his client,
is not liable to third parties in the absence of fraudulent or malicious conduct. McQue v.
Hyatt Legal Services. Inc., 813 P.2d 754, 756-57 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Marelius v. Field.
DeGoff. Huppert & McGowan. 160 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979); Atkinson v. IHC Hospital Inc..
798 P.2d 733, 735-36 (Utah 1990) (an attorney had no duty to properly advise plaintiffs on
the adequacy of settlement of a claim where the attorney was retained by the hospital against
which the claim was made for purposes of drafting settlement documents for presentation to
the court for approval).

13

The only basis for Ms. Pasquin to allege that the Duffins were her attorneys is
that the Duffins represented the partnership and that she was a member of the partnership
under the alleged oral agreement. Ms. Pasquin alleged no specific communications or
actions on the part of the Duffins to support her belief that the Duffins were her attorneys.
She alleged nothing to indicate that the Duffins were ever informed or knew that she claimed
to be a partner, until well after the corporation had been formed and the partnership at will
had been dissolved. She pled no facts indicating fraudulent or malicious conduct on the part
of the Duffins. Accordingly, Ms. Pasquin may not hold the Duffins liable in connection with
the Duffins' representation of Kory and John Pasquin.
B.

The Duffins Owed Ms. Pasquin No Separate Fiduciary Duty

Fiduciary duties do not exist in the abstract nor arise out of thin air. They are
1) created by or arise out of contract or 2) implied in law under circumstances such as when
there is confidence reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence on the other.
First Security Bank v. Banberry Development. 786 P.2d 1326, 1332-33 (Utah 1990);
Dennison State Bank v. Madeira. 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982).
No contract ever existed between the Duffins and Ms. Pasquin out of which
a fiduciary duty could arise. As argued above, the Duffins did not represent Ms. Pasquin in
any capacity. The Duffins were not parties to the alleged oral contracts for partnership or
lifetime employment and cannot be held liable for any obligations or breach of duties arising
thereunder. An agent acting within the scope of his authority is not liable in tort to third
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persons for economic harm caused by his actions.

State Ex. Rel. Ranni Assoc, v.

Hartenbach. 742 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Banc. 1987); American Ins. Co. v. Material Transmit
Inc.. 446 A.2d 1101 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1982); Greyhound Corporation v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Ca, 19 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Section 359 of Restatement of Agency (Second) (1958) clearly states this rule
as follows:
An agent who intentionally or negligently fails to perform duties
to his principal is not thereby liable to a third person whose
economic interests are thereby harmed.
This case is analogous to one where an insurance company hires an attorney
to represent the insurance company in the matter of settlement of claims against its insured.
When an attorney is representing only the interest of the insurance company in the matter of
the settlement of claims against the insured, "if the attorney fails to give proper consideration
to the interests of the insured causing loss to the insured there is no cause of action against
the attorney because he owes no duty in that respect to the insured. In that case, the insured's
cause of action is only against the insurance company." Lysick v. Walcom. 258 Cal. App.
2d 136, 65 Cal. Reptr. 406, 415-16 (1968).
Similarly, no circumstances exist in this case such that a fiduciary duty should
be implied in law. It is undisputed that Ms. Pasquin had no basis to repose confidence in the
Duffins. The Duffins' unrebutted affidavits state that they never had any knowledge that Ms.
Pasquin was or claimed to be a partner in Quality Parts.
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Because there was no

communication whatsoever between the Duffins and Ms. Pasquin there was no way for them
to exercise domination and influence over Ms. Pasquin.
No fiduciary duty existed under contract or could be implied in law under the
facts existing in this case. Accordingly, the Duffins cannot be held liable by Ms. Pasquin for
legal advice rendered to their clients: the Quality Parts partnership consisting of Kory and
John Pasquin or the Quality Transport corporation formed by Kory and John Pasquin.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MS. PASQUIN'S RULE
56(f) MOTION WITH RESPECT TO THE DUFFINS
Ms. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion was correctly denied with respect to the

Duffins because Ms. Pasquin failed to support her motion with an affidavit specifying the
facts she believed further discovery would produce to defeat the Duffins' Motion for
Summary Judgment. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion for
similar reasons, explaining:
[E]ven if a party does file an affidavit or the court is willing to
consider other material in place of an affidavit, the opposing
party must nevertheless explain how the continuance will aid his
opposition to summary judgment, [citations omitted] . . . the
party opposing the motion must present facts in proper form...
And the opposing party's facts must be material and of a
substantial nature.
id at 841 citing 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ^f 56.15[3]
(2ded. 1987).
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In this case, Ms. Pasquin merely argued in her Rule 56(f) motion that she had
made timely discovery requests and attempted depositions, but was thwarted in her discovery
efforts by the Pasquin defendants' failure to cooperate or other events beyond her control.
She nowhere states in her Rule 56(f) supporting memorandum what specific facts she sought
to discover that might assist in proving her claims against the Duffms. Indeed any such
allegation on her part would contradict the allegation in her Verified Complaint that her first
contact with the Duffms on the subject of her alleged status as a partner or lifetime employee
occurred at a meeting in the fall of 1996 in the Duffms' offices. (R. 97)
Ms. Pasquin did not and could not have submitted specific facts in an affidavit
supporting a Rule 56(f) motion opposing the Duffin defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Accordingly, the court correctly denied the Rule 56(f) motion with regard to the
Duffin defendants.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that the alleged oral partnership agreement was
void under the statute of frauds. The Duffms owed no legal duty to Ms. Pasquin. Ms.
Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion with respect to the Duffms' Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing with prejudice Ms. Pasquin's claims against the Duffms was properly denied.
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Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's Amended Summary Judgment
dismissing with prejudice Ms. Pasquin's claims against the Duffins.
DATED this "2-Sday of November, 1998.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

CARMAN E. KIPP
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Thomas A. Duffin and Daniel O. Duffin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ^—^ day of
November, 1998, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES
THOMAS A. DUFFIN AND DANIEL O. DUFFIN, to the following:
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C.
Attorney for Geri Pasquin
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Steven L. Taylor
Murphy, Tolboe and Mabey
Attorneys for John Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts, and
Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Robert H. Copier
Attorney for the Estate of Kory Pasquin
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
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ADDENDUM

CARMAN E.KIPP 1829
MICHAEL F. SK0LNICK4671
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 5352
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P. C.
Attorneys for Thomas A. Duffin & Daniel 0. Duffin
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
(801)521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GERI PASQUIN,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS A. DUFFIN

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

JOHN PASQUIN; JIMMIE PASQUIN;
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN;
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general
partnership; QUALITY TRANSPORT
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC.;
THOMAS A. DUFFIN AND DANIEL O.
DUFFIN,

:

Civil No. 970900011 CV

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

)
" SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Thomas A. Duffin, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:

1.

That I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah.

1

2.

That I was the lawyer handling business matters on behalf of Quality

Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.; and Quality Parts, a Utah general partnership. My
clients during this period of time were Kory Pasquin and John Pasquin.
3.

That in approximately 1990, John Pasquin contacted me concerning

the representation of Quality Parts, a business, which at that time was located on
Redwood Road. I met with him and Kory Pasquin during that period of time.
4.

That between 1991 and 1994, telephone calls were always exchanged

between Quality Parts and this law firm. During this period of time, I had no contact with
Geri Pasquin in a business sense as a partner of Quality Parts or as a person having any
interest in the corporation, Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. I had no specific
dealings with Geri Pasquin at all.
5.

That there are no writings of which I am aware that would represent

to this court that Geri Pasquin had any interest in either of these businesses. She may
have been an employee, but she certainly had no ownership interest.
DATED this

f

day of

AJLJL-&

1997.

Thomas A. Duffin
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this W l

1997.

Notary Public
JENEFER WELCH
757 West 1300 South
Woods Cross, Utaft 84087
My Commission Expires
February 24 2001

— SjajeoiUte!?_ j j

pJ
day of September,

CARMAN E. KIPP 1829
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK4671
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 5352
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P. C.
Attorneys for Thomas A. Duffin & Daniel 0. Duffin
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building

Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
(801)521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GERI PASQUIN,

AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL 0. DUFFIN

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN PASQUIN; JIMMIE PASQUIN;
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN;
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general
partnership; QUALITY TRANSPORT
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC.;
THOMAS A. DUFFIN AND DANIEL O.
DUFFIN,

Civil No. 970900011 CV

Defendants.

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Daniel 0. Duffin, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

That I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah.

1

2.

That I was the lawyer handling business matters on behalf of Quality

Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.; and Quality Parts, a Utah general partnership. My
clients during this period of time were Kory Pasquin and John Pasquin.
3.

That during the time of incorporation of Transport Refrigeration Parts,

Inc, I had conversations with both Kory Pasquin and John Pasquin. Geri Pasquin's name
was never mentioned during this time nor in any subsequent conversations with either of
myCl entS

'

'

£&
4.

That botwoon 1001 w H 0 0 1 ; telephone calls were always exchanged

between Quality Parts and this law firm. During this period of time, I had no contact with
Geri Pasquin in a business sense as a partner of Quality Parts or as a person having any
interest in the corporation, Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. I had no specific
dealings with Geri Pasquin at all.
5.

That there are no writings of which I am aware that would represent

to this court that Geri Pasquin had any interest in either of these businesses. She may
have been an employee, but she certainly had no ownership interest.
DATED this

?

day of ^gereufcgfc.

1997.

(^d£

Daniel 0. Duffirr

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ffifrl da^of September,
1997.

JT ^MTB^V

Notary PUSHC

JENEFERWET
757 West 1300 South
Woods Cross Utah 84067
My Commission Expires
February 24,2001

. — StatejofUtah^^ J j

